In this paper, we present a sequential decomposition algorithm to compute graphon mean-field equillibrium (GMFE) of dynamic graphon mean-field games (GMFGs). We consider a large population of players sequentially making strategic decisions where the actions of each player affect their neighbors which is captured in a graph, generated by a known graphon. Each player observes a private state and also a common information as a graphon mean-field population state which represents the empirical networked distribution of other players' types. We consider non-stationary population state dynamics and present a novel backward recursive algorithm to compute GMFE that depend on both, a player's private type, and the current (dynamic) population state determined through the graphon.
I. INTRODUCTION
Strategic interaction of interconnected agents has been an important topic of study for many decades and its relevance has been increasing rapidly with the progress of internet penetration and smartphone devices in our society. The recent decade has seen tremendous technological advancement in the field of networking applications that has led to an unprecedented scale of interaction among people and devices such as in ride sharing platforms, social media apps, cyber-physical systems, large scale renewable energy, electric vehicles, cryptocurrencies and smart grid systems. For instance, the influence of social networks in the decision making of majority of individuals is a known phenomenon. Most decisions by individuals from which products to buy to whom to vote for are influenced by friends and acquaintances. The emerging empirical evidence on these issues motivates the theoretical study of network effects with strategic agents. The analysis, design and control of such systems that involve strategic interactions embedded in a networked environment could lead to more intelligent and efficient applications, and can enhance our understanding of the mechanics of such interactions.
Many of the above mentioned applications of interest have following key features: (a) large number of strategic players (b) dynamically evolving incomplete information, and (c) an underlying network. Game theory is a natural choice to model such interactions where the payoffs obtained by individuals depend on the action of her neighbors.
A shortcoming of the standard approach to solve dynamic network games with incomplete information is interdependence of strategies of the players across time. Moreover, as the number of players become large as is the case in many practical scenarios considered here, computing Nash equilibrium becomes intractable.
A. Relevant Literature
Maskin and Tirole in [1] introduced the concept of Markov perfect equillibrium (MPE) for dynamic games governed by an underlying Markov decision process (MDP). The strategies thus computed depend on the present state and not on the past trajectory of the game. In general, there exists a backward recursive methodology to compute MPE of the game. Some prominent examples of the application of MPE include [2] , [3] , [4] . Ericson and Pakes in [2] model industry dynamics for firms' entry, exit and investment participation, through a dynamic game with symmetric information, compute its MPE, and prove ergodicity of the equilibrium process. Bergemann and Välimäki in [3] study a learning process in a dynamic oligopoly with strategic sellers and a single buyer, allowing for price competition among sellers. They study MPE of the game and its convergence behavior. Acemoglu and Robinson in [4] develop a theory of political transitions in a country by modeling it as a repeated game between the elites and the poor, and study its MPE.
In large population games, computing MPE with the methods specified above becomes intractable. Mean field games (MFG) were introduced in Huang, Malhamé,and Caines [5] , and Lasry and Lions [6] to model the strategic interactions with large number of players. In such games, the individual agents have minimal impact of the overall outcome of the game and so the agents track a mean distribution of states of other agents rather than their actual states. MFGs is an excellent and a tractable model to study large population dynamic games of incomplete information, and has been shown to be a good approximation of Nash equilibrium (or MPE) of the original game as the number of players grow large (for instance see [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] and references therein).
Parise and Ozdaglar introduced the notion of graphon games [12] to model large population static network games, where graphon is generative model of a large random graph inroduced by Loväsz in [13] . Caines and Huang in [14] combined the ideas of mean-field equillibrium (MFE) and graphon games to define Graphon Mean field games (GMFGs) where there are a large number of strategic agents with dynamic incomplete information who interact on an underlying fixed network generated by a known graphon. GMFGs combine the idea of network games defined through graphons and the mean field framework of describing multi agent homogeneous games and predicting equilibrium in a tractable manner. Large network of nodes interacting with one another can be represented as graphons and mean field games deal with the study of such large interaction among devices and people as agents to analyze such systems to design and understand the behavior of such large scale interactions and their impact on our society. The progress in research in the mean field domain have been restricted to cases where the agents interacted in a perfect homogeneous environment and the interactions between the agents were assumed to be uniform irrespective of the location of the agent in the network. What if, the population interaction was not uniform and there was a measure of how the agents interacted with each other or in other words, the payoff and the transition to the next state was conditional on the relative position of the agent in the network. The mean field distribution would be affected by it so will the optimum policies and the Nash equilibrium thus generated. The theoretical basis for such a case has been provided in [14] which generalizes the idea of mean field games across the population with different levels of interactions through GMFG. In this paper, we propose a sequential decomposition algorithm to compute GMFGs by decomposing the problem across time, which reduces the complexity of computing GMFGs from exponential to linear in time.
We consider a discounted infinite-horizon dynamic graphon mean-field game where there is a large population of homogeneous players each having a private type. Each player sequentially makes strategic decisions and is affected by other players in its neighborhood through a graphon mean-field population state. Each player has a private type that evolves through a controlled Markov process as a function of the graphon, which only she observes and all players observe a common population state which is the distribution of other players' types. In such games, the graphon mean-field state evolves through McKean-Vlasov forward equation given a policy of the players and the graphon function. The equilibrium policy satisfies the Bellman backward equation, given the graphon mean-field states. Thus to compute equilibrium, one needs to solve the coupled backward and forward fixed-point equation in the graphon mean-field and the equilibrium policy.
In order to demonstrate the utility of our algorithm to compute the GMFE of a graphon mean field game for varying graphons, we consider a cyber-security example of malware spread problem. A cluster of nodes in a network of physical servers get infected by an independent random process. For each node, there is a higher risk of getting infected due to negative externality imposed by other infected players. A graphon function is defined that quantifies the effect of the effect of the state of other nodes in the network on the concerned node. At each time t, a node privately observes its own state and publicly observes the population of infected nodes, based on which it has to make a decision to repair or not. Upon taking an action, the transition of to the next state is governed by both its individual action and the actions affected by the neighboring agents given by a graphon function. Using our algorithm, we find equilibrium strategies of the players which are observed to be non-decreasing in the healthy population state.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we present a model of the graphon mean field game, followed by some preliminary result from our past research regarding MPE in strategic dynamic games. In section III, we present our main results where we present algorithm to compute MPE for both finite and infinite horizon game, and also present existence results. In section V, we show the simulation results for the cyber-security example assuming different graphons and conclude in Section VI.
B. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase for their realizations. For any variable, subscripts represent time indices and superscripts represent player identities. We use notation −α to represent all players other than player α i.e. −α = {1, 2, . . . i − 1, i + 1, . . . , N }. We use notation a t:t ′ to represent the vector (a t , a t+1 , . . . a t ′ ) when t ′ ≥ t or an empty vector if t ′ < t. We use a −α and |S| represents its cardinality. We denote by P σ (or E σ ) the probability measure generated by (or expectation with respect to) strategy profile σ. We denote the set of real numbers by R. For a probabilistic strategy profile
All equalities and inequalities involving random variables are to be interpreted in a.s. sense.
II. MODEL AND BACKGROUND

A. Graphon Mean Field Games
Let us consider a discrete-time large population sequential game with N homogeneous players with N → ∞. At instant t, the player α observes the trajectory (µ G 1:t , x α 1:t ) and takes an action a α t according to a behavioral strategy
We denote the space of such strategies as K σ . This implies
We denote Z t to be the space of population states µ G 1:t till time t. We denote H α t = Z t × X t to be set of observed histories (µ G 1:t , x α 1:t ) of player α. For finite time-horizon game, G T , each player wants to maximize its total expected discounted reward over a time horizon T , discounted by discount factor 0 < δ ≤ 1,
NE and MPE for G ∞ are defined in a similar way where summation in the above equations is taken such that T is replaced by ∞.
III. A METHODOLOGY TO COMPUTE GMFGS
In this section, we will provide a backward recursive methodology to compute GMFGs for both G T and G ∞ .
We will consider Markovian equilibrium strategies of player α which depend on the common information at time t, µ G For a given prescription function γ α t = θ α [µ G t ], the graphon mean-field µ G t evolves according to the discrete-time McKean Vlasov equation, ∀y ∈ X and ∀α ∈ [0, 1]:
which implies
A. Backward recursive algorithm for G T In this subsection, we will provide a methodology to generate GMFE of G T of the form described above. We define an equilibrium generating function
In addition, we generate a reward-to-go function
These quantities are generated through a fixed-point equation as follows.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.
B. Converse
In the following, we show that every GMFE can be found using the above backward recursion.
Theorem 2 (Converse). Letσ be a GMFE of the graphon mean field game. Then there exists an equilibrium generating function θ that satisfies (13) in backward recursion such thatσ is defined using θ.
Proof. Please see Appendix C.
C. Backward recursive algorithm for G ∞
In this section, we consider the infinite-horizon problem G ∞ , for which we assume the reward function R to be absolutely bounded.
We define an equilibrium generating function θ :
In addition, we generate a reward-to-go function V : µ G × X → R. These quantities are generated through a fixed-point equation as follows.
For all µ G , setγ = θ[z]. Then (γ, V ) are solution of the following fixed-point equation 3 
where expectation in (17) is with respect to random variable (A α , X α,′ ) through the measure γ(a α |x α )Q α (x α ′ |x α , a α , µ G ).
Then an equilibrium strategy is defined as
The following theorem shows that the strategy thus constructed is a GMFE of the game. Theorem 3. A strategy (σ) constructed from the above algorithm is a GMFE of the game i.e. ∀t, h α t ∈ H α t , σ α ,
Proof. Please see Appendix D.
D. Converse
Theorem 4 (Converse). Letσ be a GMFE the graphon mean field game. Then there exists an equilibrium generating function θ that satisfies (13) in backward recursion such thatσ is defined using θ.
Proof. Please see Appendix F.
IV. EXISTENCE
In this section, we discuss sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution of the fixed-point equations (13) and (17). For a complete, Erdos Rényi, symmetric stochastic block model, and random geometric graphon, every player is statistically equivalent. Thus from proposition 1, the players share the same McKean-Vlasov (MKV) mean field evolution function and so the same mean field.
Let n be the total number of statistically different players. Then µ G can be replaced by {µ} i=1,...,n . With the proposition we can represent the graphon mean field population state as
..,n = µ ∀i (23)
A. Cybersecurity Example
We consider a cyber-security example where a cluster of nodes, facing a possible malware attack in a network, do a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether to opt for repairing. The results of this analysis, however, could be extended to many different cases like the vaccination in a population, entry and exit of firms, financial markets, demand response in smart-grid and so on. The dynamics of each of the node is affected by the action of the neighboring nodes connected with different measures captured in a network graph and represented as a graphon function G. In this example, we assume different graphon functions and obtain the optimal policies using our sequential decomposition algorithm assuming that the graphs are symmetric with respect to the participating agents.
In the model, the node can have two states x α ∈ X = {0, 1} representing healthy and infected node respectively.
Similarly, there are two actions at their disposal for each of the state a α ∈ A = {0, 1} which says whether the nodes gets repaired with a cost or takes the risk by not undergoing repair. The chances of a node getting affected by a malware attack depends on the population as well as the state of the neighboring nodes according to the graphon.
The dynamics of the model are given as
where w α t ∈ {0, 1} is a binary random variable with
It is assumed that the value of P{w α t = 1} is q when the graph is fully connected i.e. g (α, η) = 1 and the mean state of the neighbors µ t (x β ) = 1. The value of q is assumed to be 0.9 for our simulation. The reward function is given as
The value k represents the penalty if the node gets infected and λ represents the cost of repair. The values k and λ are assumed as 0.3 and 0.2 respectively for our simulation. Here we implement our algorithm to derive equilibrium for this problem by considering three popular network models to capture the interaction between the population.
We consider the following graphons:
1) Fully Connected Graph: The graphon function is given as
2) Erdös Renyi Graph: The graphon function is given as
We assume a value p = 0.8 for our simulation.
3) Stochastic Block Model:The graphon function is given as
Here, p represents the intra-community interaction and is assumed as p = .9 for our simulation. Similarly, q = .4 represents the inter-community interaction parameter.
4) Random Geometric graph:
The graphon function is given as
where f : [0, .5] → [0, 1] is a non-increasing function, and in our simulation we assume it to be f (x) = e the relation between µ t and µ t+1 as presented in the (9) . Figure V -A shows the equilibrium mean field or in the specific case that we consider when with time, the a mean field distribution of 0.5 approaches different mean field states for different graphons but with the same state dynamics.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider both finite and infinite horizon, large population dynamic game where each player is affected by others through a graphon mean-field population state. We present a novel backward recursive algorithm to compute non-stationary, signaling GMFG for such games, where each player's strategy depends on its current private type and the current graphon mean-field population state. The non-triviality in the problem is that the update of population state is coupled to the strategies of the game, and is managed in the algorithm through unique construction of the fixed-point equations (13) ,(17). We proved the existence of such equilibrium. Using this algorithm, we considered a malware propagation problem where we numerically computed equilibrium strategies of the players. In general, this algorithm be could instrumental in studying non-stationary equilibria in a number of applications such as financial markets, social learning, renewable energy.
APPENDIX A
Proof. We prove (16) using induction and the results in Lemma 1, and 2 proved in Appendix B. For base case at
where (31a) follows from Lemma 2 and (31b) follows from Lemma 1 in Appendix B.
Let the induction hypothesis be that for t + 1, ∀i ∈ [N ], µ G 1:t+1 ∈ (H c t+1 ), x α 1:t+1 ∈ (X ) t+1 , σ α , T n=t δ n−t−1 R(X α n , A α n , µ G n ; g α ) µ G 1:t , x α
where (33a) follows from Lemma 2, (33b) follows from Lemma 1, (33c) follows from Lemma 2, (33d) follows from induction hypothesis in (32b) and (33e) follows since the random variables involved in the right conditional expectation do not depend on strategies σ α t . 
